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Bigger Isn’t Always Better: An Analysis
of Court Efficiency Using Hierarchical
Linear Modeling
Teresa Dalton* and Jordan M. Singer†
One important measure of trial court efficiency is overall case
length—that is, the elapsed time from a case’s initial filing to its final
disposition. Using a large, recent dataset from nearly 7000 federal civil
cases, we find that two variables are particularly useful in predicting
overall case length: the total number of attorneys filing an appearance in
the case, and the number of authorized judgeships for a given district
court. Further, we find a significant and surprising interaction between
these two variables, indicating that smaller courts are more efficient
than larger courts at processing civil cases when more than three
attorneys appear in a case, but that the opposite holds true when three
attorneys or fewer appear in a case.
I.

Introduction

The efficient resolution of disputes has long been a central goal of
the American civil justice system. All else being equal, the speedier
resolution of cases promotes better financial certainty and psychological
closure for litigants, as well as more manageable dockets for judges. By
contrast, delay in civil cases is frequently associated with higher costs1
and reduced value of judgments.2 In light of these realities, the
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1. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case
Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 814 & n.8 (2000).
2. See, e.g., George Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69
B.U. L. REV. 527, 534 (1989).
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importance of timely civil case processing has been codified in federal
legislation,3 court rules,4 and internal court procedures.5
A widespread commitment to timely case resolutions, however, has
not translated into uniform results. Despite the efforts of researchers,
court personnel, and even Congress to identify and address sources of
delay in the civil justice system, consistent and efficient case processing
in the federal district courts remains remarkably elusive. Average
disposition times still vary widely from district court to district court,
even for the same type of case.6 Moreover, most of the seminal studies
of delay are decades old. Additional research and analysis is needed.
We offer a modest but important contribution to the collective
understanding of civil case processing times, using a recent, large, and
detailed data set drawn from approximately 6700 closed cases in seven
federal district courts. We employ a multilevel modeling technique
known as hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to capture and evaluate the
relationship between the overall length of a case and a variety of
variables attendant to the case.
Our analysis yields two surprising conclusions. First, we find a
relationship between the overall length of a civil case, the size of the
federal district court where it is pending (as measured by the number of
authorized district judges), and the total number of attorneys who filed an
appearance in the case. Put differently, the length of a civil case can be
predicted by the number of district judges on the court and the number of
attorneys appearing in the case. Second, and even more intriguing, we
find that larger and smaller courts switch in relative efficiency as the
number of attorneys in a case grows. Specifically, in cases in which
three or fewer total attorneys have filed an appearance, larger courts are
predicted to process the case faster than do smaller courts. Conversely,
3. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(a), 104 Stat.
5093 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012)).
4. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the entire body of rules shall “be construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.”).
5. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990
FINAL REPORT: ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR REDUCTION OF COST AND DELAY
ASSESSMENT OF PRINCIPLES, GUIDELINES & TECHNIQUES 3-4 (1997).
6. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL CASE
PROCESSING IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ANALYSIS 2829 (2009) [hereinafter CIVIL CASE PROCESSING] (noting differences in mean and median
time to disposition in selected district courts for common federal cases, including Civil
Rights – Employment cases and “Other Civil Rights” cases).
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in cases in which more than three total attorneys have filed an
appearance, smaller courts are more efficient. Below, we detail our
methodology and findings, and offer some preliminary observations.
II. Background to the Study
Most studies of trial court efficiency have operated as inquiries into
caseflow management, a technique for reducing delays by carefully
managing the time between major events in the life of a case. The
heyday of caseflow management research occurred from the mid-1970s
to the mid-1980s, when then-Chief Justice Warren Burger made efficient
civil case processing a key component of his vision for the American
judicial system.7 Between 1977 and 1990, researchers from the Federal
Judicial Center,8 National Center for State Courts,9 and the RAND
Institute for Civil Justice10 published studies on case processing in
federal and state courts. These studies focused on the time between
events in the life of a case, such as the number of days from case filing to
the close of discovery, or the number of days a court took to rule on a
motion. These studies also introduced metrics that allowed, for the first
time, comparisons across different judges and courts. No efforts,
however, were made to provide predictive models.
7. Chief Justice Burger’s interest in the application of modern business
administration methods to the courts spanned his entire career on the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Remarks on the State of the
Federal Judiciary (Aug. 10, 1970), in HOWARD JAMES, CRISIS IN THE COURTS (1971), at
iv; Warren E. Burger, Introduction to Symposium, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation,
37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217 (1985).
8. See, e.g., PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS
AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978); PAUL R. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA
A. LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE
PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980); STEVEN FLANDERS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE
MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
(1977).
9. See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); JOHN GOERDT ET
AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING COURT DELAY: THE PACE OF LITIGATION
IN 26 URBAN TRIAL COURTS, 1987 (1989); BARRY MAHONEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS (1988); LARRY L. SIPES ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGING TO REDUCE DELAY (1980).
10. See, e.g., TERENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990);
PATRICIA A. EBENER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE
PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY (1980).

3

1172

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:3

Formal studies of case processing and delay prevention were soon
joined by legislative enactments. In 1990, Congress passed the Civil
Justice Reform Act (CJRA), which required each federal district court to
develop a civil justice expense and delay reduction plan.11 The CJRA set
out six preferred case management techniques,12 and required that ten
pilot districts implement the techniques for further study. 13 In 1996, the
RAND Institute for Civil Justice reported the results of the CJRA pilot,
concluding that the preferred techniques as implemented had little effect
on overall case length.14 The RAND study would represent the last
major civil case processing study for more than a decade.
In 2009, a major new study of civil case processing was issued by
the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System at the
University of Denver (IAALS). The study examined the dockets of
nearly 7700 cases in eight federal district courts, all of which were
terminated between October 1, 2005 and September 30, 2006.15 The
study focused on the time between events in the life of a civil case,
including the overall time from filing to disposition.16 Consistent with
earlier caseflow management literature, the IAALS study concluded
generally that lowering overall time to disposition “does not appear to be
a matter of addressing one or two specific pretrial practices, but rather
striving to improve the time between events at every stage of the case.”17
While the IAALS study amassed extensive structural data on each case
(such as the number of parties and attorneys on each side, number and
type of motions filed, and identity of the presiding judge(s)), it did not
explicitly examine the relationship between these data and the overall
length of a case.18
Collectively, these studies and others like them have spawned an
extensive literature offering delay prevention strategies and techniques

11. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2012)).
12. Id. § 473.
13. Id. § 477.
14. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS (1996); see also JAMES S. KAKALIK ET
AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996).
15. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 9.
18. See id.
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for courts and judges at both the federal and state level.19 But the
primary focus of these studies has been on the management of individual
events in the life of case, rather than structural factors outside of a
judge’s control that nevertheless may influence case length. Our
objective here is to examine these broader structural relationships, using
the same rich data set compiled for the recent IAALS study.
III. Study Methodology
As noted above, the cases used in the present study were selected
from a data set compiled by IAALS for the purposes of a larger civil case
management study.20 Researchers at IAALS initially selected fifteen
United States District Courts for possible analysis. The fifteen courts
were chosen to reflect diversity of size (as measured by the
Congressionally authorized number of district judges),21 geography, and
national ranking in judicial caseload profiles, based on publicly available
Federal Caseload Management Statistics. With respect to the latter
category, courts are ranked based on, among other things, their median
times from filing to disposition of civil cases.22 IAALS selected courts
19. See, e.g., CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6; COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. &
CASE MGMT., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT
MANUAL (2001); ROBERT J. NIEMIC ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR (2001); DAVID RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION P LANS:
A SOURCEBOOK (1995); WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
THE ELEMENTS OF CASE MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006);
DAVID C. STEELMAN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT:
THE HEART OF COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM (2000).
20. The results of the study are reported in CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6.
While drawing from the same data set as the study in this article, the IAALS report
examines more cases overall and addresses specific case management practices in depth.
21. Each federal district court is authorized by Congress to have a certain number of
full-time district judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2012). In addition, each court may control
its caseload through the use of magistrate judges (appointed for terms pursuant to Article
I of the Constitution), senior judges (district judges who have taken senior status and
have substantial discretion over the type and volume of their caseloads), and visiting
judges (who are assigned to another district but preside over specific cases). The number
of authorized judgeships per district is intended in part to be reflective of the district’s
caseload. See Erwin C. Surrency, Federal District Court Judges and the History of Their
Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139, 151 (1967).
22. See
Federal
Court
Management
Statistics,
U.
S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/fcmstat/index.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014). The Federal
Court Management Statistics are updated as of September 30 of each calendar year. The
IAALS study used the statistics ending September 30, 2006, which reflect the twelve-
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with a wide range of national rankings in this category. All fifteen courts
were contacted to request a fee waiver for access to publicly available
case dockets through the federal courts’ electronic PACER interface. 23
Ten of the fifteen courts granted the waiver, and eight of those ten courts
were eventually selected for inclusion in the IAALS database.24
The research in this article is based on data from over 6700 cases in
seven of the courts selected for the IAALS study—the United States
District Courts for the District of Arizona, District of Colorado, District
of Idaho, Eastern District of Missouri, District of Oregon, Eastern
District of Virginia, and Western District of Wisconsin.25 The data
pertain to all civil cases in those seven districts that closed during the
one-year period from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006, with
limited exceptions.26 The data were drawn exclusively from electronic
case dockets available through the PACER system.
Drawing from the IAALS database, this Article uses the number of
Congressionally authorized district judges as a surrogate measure for
court size under the assumption that judicial allocation was appropriate
for caseload. We do not account specifically for senior or visiting judges,
although we note that virtually every district court in the study was

month period during which the cases in the study were terminated or otherwise closed.
23. Public access to federal court dockets is available through the Public Access to
Court Electronic Records system (PACER) at a set cost per page viewed. At the time of
data collection, this cost was set at eight cents per page. See PACER User Manual for
ECF Courts, PACER PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, 2, available at
http://www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/documents/pacermanual.pdf (last updated Jan. 2006).
This charge applies to search results even if the search yields no matches. See id.
Although the charge for any one search or document view was capped at $2.40 – the cost
of thirty pages – the cumulative charge for viewing the docket sheet, motions and
pleadings necessary to complete the study would have quickly totaled tens of thousands
of dollars. IAALS has expressed its gratitude to each district court that granted a waiver
to allow it to develop its dataset without incurring a substantial financial burden.
24. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 20-21.
25. One small court in the IAALS study was not selected for this study in order to
assure an equal balance of small and large courts.
26. The IAALS database excluded certain categories of cases with unusual
procedural postures, specifically student loan cases, recovery of overpayment and
enforcement of judgments, recovery of overpayment of veterans’ benefits, forfeiture
cases, social security cases, and prisoner petitions. In addition, a random sample of
approximately 400 cases each was taken from the District of Arizona and the Eastern
District of Virginia because the sheer number of closed cases in those districts was
prohibitively high for full data entry. A probability sampling scheme was implemented
for closed cases in these two districts.
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assisted by their contributions during the time period reviewed.27 Nor do
we expressly account for vacant judgeship months, which affected one
district during the relevant timeframe.28 It is not a focus of this Article to
ascertain if the various courts have the appropriate number of sitting
judges, but rather if the number of judges assigned by statute has an
effect on the overall efficiency of the courts as measured by the length of
cases from date of filing to date of disposition (case length). The data
were drawn from two small courts (with two authorized district judges
each), three courts of medium size (with six or seven authorized district
judges each) and two large courts (with eleven and twelve authorized
district judges, respectively).
The overall length of the case, as measured from filing to
disposition, was chosen as the dependent variable for this study. We
selected this variable for a number of reasons. First, and most
fundamentally, overall case length is an available measure in every case.
By contrast, focusing on the presence of specific procedural events, such
as summary judgment or trial, would eliminate a large number of cases
that settle or otherwise terminate without reaching the dispositive motion
or trial phase. Second, while overall time to disposition alone cannot
adequately capture information about satisfaction with the federal
judicial system, it is one component in measuring satisfaction, and for
many a rather important one.29 Protracted litigation strains court
resources,30 places financial burdens on litigants,31 results in increasingly
devalued judgments,32 increases the likelihood of faded memories and
27. CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, App. G.
28. Judicial Caseload Profile, Eastern District of Virginia 2006, U.S. COURTS,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2006.pl.
29. By this, we do not mean to suggest that case length itself is an adequate proxy
for justice. A just result in any case, civil or criminal, must take into account not only the
time it took to resolve the dispute, but also the financial (and physical and emotional) cost
to the litigants, completeness of the legal analysis and application in conformity with
established law at every stage of the case and adequate safeguards for procedural due
process. See Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a
More Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 55,
75 (2013) (arguing that court productivity must account for the efficiency, accuracy, and
procedural fairness of adjudication).
30. See Larry L. Sipes, Reducing Delay in State Courts—A March Against Folly, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 299 (1985).
31. See, e.g., Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in
Tort Litigation: The Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 320
(2005).
32. See, e.g., Patrick Johnston, Civil Justice Reform: Juggling Between Politics and
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stale evidence,33 and prevents psychological closure.34 Some courts are
simply better at resolving cases more quickly and we look to what these
courts have in common.
At the individual case level, this study considered many variables
that may have been associated with overall case length. These variables
included the type of case (otherwise known as “nature of suit”);35 identity
of the presiding district judge; involvement (if any) of a magistrate
judge; number of plaintiff attorneys filing appearances; number of
defendant attorneys filing appearances; elapsed time between case filing
and the initial scheduling conference; number of motions on disputed
discovery;36 number of motions brought under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12; number of motions brought under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56; elapsed time for the court to rule on each such motion;
whether a hearing was held on each such motion; number of extensions
or continuances sought and granted; length of each major continuance;
court-sponsored efforts at alternative dispute resolution; length of trial
and type of trial (with or without a jury), if any; and appellate history. Of
the variables present in every case, we found that number of attorneys
filing an appearance was the most highly correlated with case length with
very little difference between the correlation of number of plaintiff
attorneys and case length (r=.31, p-value<.01) and number of defense
attorneys with case length (r=.29, p-value<.01). In fact, combining these
variables into a single measure called ‘total attorneys’ yielded the highest
correlation (r=.35, p-value<.01). We decided at the case level we would
use total attorneys to predict case length.
It is important to reiterate here that we are measuring the number of
attorneys who filed an appearance in each case – i.e., those attorneys
who signed a pleading, appeared for a hearing or conference, or
otherwise placed themselves on record as representing a party in a case.
These numbers do not—and indeed cannot—account for those (typically

Perfection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 833, 876-77 & nn.251, 258 (1994).
33. See id. at 877 n.252.
34. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL’Y & L. 880 (2000).
35. We conducted modeling using “nature of suit,” but with over sixty categories
and with some categories possessing fewer than five cases, too little separation existed to
create an interpretable multilevel model.
36. This category includes a range of motions brought when parties are unable to
resolve discovery-related issues, including motions to compel, motions to quash, and
motions for discovery sanctions.
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junior) attorneys who are not listed on the case docket but who may
spend hundreds or thousands of hours on the case outside of the court’s
direct view.
Our goal was to predict values for case length based on a function
of number of attorneys and size of courts. Cases are nested within courts
and courts can be distinguished by the authorized number of district
judges. Specifically we sought to determine if courts do differ in
efficiency based on the number of judges they have been assigned.
Hierarchical linear modeling is appropriate when data are of a nested
structure and inferences about the effect of the nesting are desired.37
Four separate models were considered and compared.
The first model was the ANOVA model which consisted of only the
dependent variable—case length—and would address the question about
differences in mean case length based on the court in which a case was
filed. The predicted case length model is as follows:
Model 1: CaseLengthij   00   0 j  rij
The second model included the Level 2 predictor SIZE which was
grand mean centered. As SIZE is not a continuous variable, centering on
the mean of all sizes will produce a value for SIZE that does not exist in
the data collected. It is, however, a useful device for interpreting the
model results as we can make statements about variation of SIZE above
the average, below the average or the effect of an average SIZE on the
model. This model would address the impact of SIZE on the y-intercept
for the regression equation. The y-intercept is the value for Case Length
when the court is of average SIZE. The predicted case length model is as
follows:
Model 2: CaseLengthij   00   01  ( SIZE j  SIZE )   0 j  rij
The third model included the Level 2 predictor SIZE which was
grand mean centered and the case level variable (Level 1) of total
number of attorneys (TOTALATT). This model would address the impact

37. See, e.g., BRYK & RAUDENBUSH, HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS (2d ed. 2002);
EUROPEAN ASS’N OF METHODOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF ADVANCED MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
(Joop J. Hox & J. Kyle Roberts eds., 2011); ITA KREFT & JAN DE LEEUW, INTRODUCING
MULTILEVEL MODELING (2007).
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of SIZE on the y-intercept for the regression equation in the presence of
the Level 1 predictor variable total number of attorneys, specifically the
predicted Case Length when the court is of average SIZE and there are
no attorneys involved. We model the slope as fixed with no random
component as the values for number of authorized district judges is fixed
in the population and fixed in the sample data. The predicted case length
model is as follows:
Model 3:
CaseLengthij   00   01  ( SIZE j  SIZE )   10  TOTALATTij   0 j  rij

The fourth and final model includes the Level two predictor SIZE
which was grand mean centered, the case level variable (Level 1) of total
number of attorneys (TOTALATT) and an interaction between SIZE and
TOTALATT. This model would address the impact of SIZE on the yintercept and slope for the regression equation in the presence of the
Level one predictor variable total number of attorneys. The predicted
case length model is as follows:
Model 4:
CaseLengthij   00   01  ( SIZE j  SIZE )   10  TOTALATTij
 11  ( SIZE j  SIZE )  TOTALATTij   0 j  rij

IV.

Results

Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the analysis at Level 1.
The average case length for all cases in the study was just over 325 days.
The average total number of attorneys, including both plaintiff and
defendant representation, in a given case was 3.7. This number includes
approximately 1.2% of cases in which neither party has an attorney of
record. Defense counsel did not file an appearance in approximately 4.8% of
cases.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/5
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics – Level 1
N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

Level 1
Total Attorneys

6753

.00

97.00

3.7072

3.47963

Case Length

6753

.00

4196.00

325.09

333.98726

Valid N (listwise)

6753

Table 2 summarizes the variable used at the Level two analysis,
SIZE. Here we find the total number of observations per court and the
respective court sizes. Due to the small number of courts per cluster
(court size), the results reported in Table 3 are those estimations of fixed
effects in which the standard errors are not robust.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics – Level 2
Cases
Court ID

SIZE

Valid
N

Case Length

Percent

Missing
N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

Arizona

12

377

100.0%

0

.0%

377

100.0%

Colorado

7

1902

100.0%

0

.0%

1902

100.0%

Idaho

2

406

100.0%

0

.0%

406

100.0%

Missouri Eastern

6

1916

100.0%

0

.0%

1916

100.0%

Oregon

6

1362

100.0%

0

.0%

1362

100.0%

Virginia Eastern

11

415

100.0%

0

.0%

415

100.0%

Wisconsin Western 2

375

100.0%

0

.0%

375

100.0%

Assumptions for linear regression were checked. The residual
distributions by size reveal a departure from normality although the plots
appear relatively normal. Linear regression is robust with regard to mild
to moderate departures from normality.38 A violation of the assumption
of homogeneity of variance was detected and this violation is

38. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBKO, CORRELATION AND REGRESSION (2d ed. 2001).
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problematic. The most likely reason for the heterogeneity of the
variances is the small sample size per court size cluster. The variances of
the different courts with respect to case length are not similar enough to
provide robust measures for linear regression. While this issue is
important, we submit these results as preliminary only and in an effort to
address this problem we ran the data with a fixed value for the variances,
fixed at the largest variance in the various courts. We found results that
were quite consistent with the results produced when the variance was
random and we report the results with the random variance.
Table 3 reports the results of the Hierarchical Linear Modeling
(HLM). Each Model was run separately and statistics were obtained. The
results will be used to compare the various models for usefulness in
application.
Starting with Model 1, the ANOVA model, we determine if HLM is
appropriate for this data. If HLM will not provide more meaningful
results than Ordinary Least Squares Regression we will use the latter due
to relative ease of interpretation. The Intraclass Correlation Coefficient
measures the proportion of variance in case length that is explained at the
court level instead of the case level.39 This value in Model 1 is 0.14;
sufficiently high to support the use of HLM to address differences in case
length.
Model 2 includes the outcome variable of Case Length at Level 1
and the Level 2 variable SIZE. Here we find that SIZE has little effect on
the y-intercept (a non-significant coefficient) when no other predictor
variable is in the model.
In the Model 3 analysis we add to the Model 2 variables a Level 1
predictor of Total Attorneys. We find this last added variable has a
significant effect on the slope of the regression line. The coefficient of
37.03 is significant at the 0.01 level. SIZE continues to be non-significant
in the model with a current coefficient of 0.007.

39. Id.
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Table 3. HLM Parameter Estimates

Statistic
Fixed Effects
Coefficients – γ00
Fixed Effects
Coefficients – γ01
Fixed Effects
Coefficients – γ10
Fixed Effects
Coefficients – γ11
Random Effects –

υ0

Random Effects – r
Deviance
Number of
Parameters
Estimated

Model 1
(ANOVA)

Model 2
(Level 2
Only)

Model 3
(Level 1&2)

Model 4 (Level
1&2,
Interaction)

322.52**

322.52**

192.38*

192.59*

.52

.007

-4.59

37.03**

36.90**
1.37**

129.96**

142.54**

121.17**

122.22**

321.76
97,168

321.76
97,159

295.28
95,997

295.14
95,988

2

2

2

2

* Significant at .05
** Significant at .01

Model 4, the final model, contains all the variables in Model 3 plus
an interaction term between Level 1 Total Attorneys and Level 2 SIZE.
We find now that SIZE has a significant effect on the slope Total
Attorneys. The Level 1 intercept (Court Mean Case Length) does not
vary much as a function of court size but the slope predicting Case
Length from Total Attorneys does. There is a significant interaction
effect between SIZE and Total Attorneys. This final model is the best fit
model and the one we will use for interpretive purposes. The deviance
declines with each model presented while the number of parameters
remains the same. The reduction of the deviance indicates an
improvement over the prior model. A higher deviance indicates a lack of
fit; the reduction indicates an improved model fit.

The Prediction Equation from Model 4 is as follows:
Predicted Case Length = 192.59 – 4.59*SIZE + 36.90*Total
Attorneys + 1.38*(SIZE*Total Attorneys)
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Interpreting the coefficients:
 192.59 is the predicted Case Length when the court is of average
size and no attorneys file an appearance. The average size here is the
average of all the court sizes used in the analysis which for this data is
6.57. This suggests that a self-represented plaintiff seeking a legal
remedy against a self-represented (or otherwise unrepresented) defendant
in an average size United States District Court can expect
resolution/disposition of the case in just under seven months.40
 –4.59 is the predicted change in the Case Length for a selfrepresented individual seeking a legal remedy in an average size United
States District Court for every one unit increase in size over the average
size (every one appointed judge over 6.57). In other words, when no
attorneys file an appearance, the predicted length of the case will go
down as the number of judges on the court increases.
 36.90 is the predicted increase in Case Length for each attorney
added to a case (on either side of the case) when the size of the court is
held constant.
 1.38 is the coefficient for the interaction between SIZE and Total
Attorneys. Based on the main effect of SIZE and total number of
attorneys, the larger the court the shorter the case length, and more
attorneys would lead to longer case lengths. In addition, in the same
court, involving more attorneys would further increase the case length
due to the significant interaction. Similarly, for two cases with the same
number of attorneys involved, the one initiated in the smaller court
would be shorter in length than the one in the larger court, but not as
much so without this significant interaction. As SIZE has been grand
mean centered we can see that the larger than average courts with any
attorneys involved will find an increase in case length. Conversely,
smaller than average courts will see a decrease as more attorneys are
added to the mix. When the court is greater than average size there is an

40. We recognize that it is the rare federal case in which there are no attorneys of
record, i.e., both parties are unrepresented. Indeed, fewer than 300 of the cases in the
study had no attorneys of record. In many of these cases, a self-represented plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed the action before the defendant had made a first appearance. Some
of these voluntary dismissals may reflect early private settlements between the parties,
obviating the need for defendants (and defense counsel) to make a formal appearance
before the court.
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additional effect that will increase the case length due to the positive
interaction coefficient. For example, if there are nine attorneys total in a
court that is one unit larger than average the increase in predicted case
length would be (9*39.90 + 1.38) = 360.48 additional days added to Case
Length.
Figure 1 graphs the interaction effect between SIZE and Total
Attorneys. We see there is a crossover at approximately three total
attorneys.
Figure 1 – HLM plot of total number of attorneys and length of case

511.4

SIZE = 2
SIZE = 6
SIZE = 7
SIZE = 11

CASELENG

431.3

SIZE = 12

351.2

271.1

190.9
1.00

2.50

4.00

5.50

7.00

TOTALATT
From the graph we see that the smaller the size of the court, starting
with a SIZE of 2, the greater the y-intercept. This means that when no
attorneys file an appearance the predicted Case Length decreases as the
size of the court increases. This relationship holds true up to the point of
3 attorneys filing an appearance. However, once the Total Attorneys
reaches approximately 3, the smaller courts gain an advantage in
efficiency and have a lower predicted Case Length than the larger courts.
That is, as the number of attorneys in a case grows, the relative
efficiency of large and small courts (as measured by overall Case
Length) inverts.
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Discussion

The crossover in efficiency at approximately three total attorneys
does not readily admit of a clear explanation. Nevertheless, we offer
some initial thoughts to interpret this rather surprising result. Our
hypotheses below are just that—hypotheses—that would benefit from
further research.
We begin with some general observations and assumptions about the
characteristics of cases with three or fewer total attorneys. First, these
cases are much more likely to involve at least one self-represented
litigant than are cases with four or more total attorneys. Purely as a
matter of definition, most cases with one or fewer attorneys listed on the
docket must involve at least one pro se litigant.41 Even many cases with
two or three attorneys of record, however, may include a self-represented
party. It is not hard to imagine, for example, a suit brought by a pro se
plaintiff against a small business that is represented by two or three
counsel over the course of litigation. Second, we assume that cases with
fewer total attorneys are, on average, smaller in scope and complexity
than cases with more attorneys. Clients typically would not choose to
pay for a large team of attorneys unless the nature of pretrial and trial
practice was itself burdensome, complex, or time-consuming.42
We also make certain assumptions about the characteristics of cases
involving four or more attorneys of record. While cases with many
attorneys could still involve self-represented litigants, we assume the
likelihood of such representation diminishes as the total number of
attorneys increases. We also assume that a larger number of attorneys is
associated with some combination of more parties, greater case
complexity, and geographic dispersal of parties and counsel. As noted
above, case complexity can lead to more attorneys of record because a
larger legal team is needed to prepare for discovery, motion practice, and
trial.43 An increase in parties can lead to more attorneys because each
41. As noted above, the exception is for cases voluntarily dismissed by a
represented plaintiff after an early negotiated settlement—a settlement which may also
involve counsel for the defendant. These dismissals constitute a small but not negligible
percentage of the overall caseload in this study.
42. See Howard M. Tollin & Tammy Feman, Litigation Management: What Legal
Defense Costs Are Reasonable and Necessary?, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 529, 530 & n.4 (1996)
(identifying cost-containment tips for insurance company defendants hiring outside
counsel and listing cases in which large legal teams were deemed necessary to handle
complex cases).
43. See, e.g., John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 623 n.99
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new party is entitled to retain its own independent counsel. While
related but legally distinct plaintiffs often retain a single counsel or firm
to represent them, and while separate defendants sometimes enter into
joint defense agreements, it remains far more typical for civil defendants
to retain separate counsel.44 Finally, the geographic dispersal of counsel
leads to additional attorneys of record due to a near-universal pro hac
vice admission practice: if a party’s lead counsel is not already admitted
to practice in the district where the case is pending (a common
occurrence for out-of-state parties, especially corporations with national
counsel), an additional “local counsel” who is admitted in the district is
required to make an appearance and must be added to the docket on the
party’s behalf.45
Any or all of these factors may increase the number of attorneys
appearing in a given civil case. However, we postulate that these factors
are not equally distributed across courts. More specifically, we assume
that in larger courts (which frequently encompass metropolitan areas and
political or financial centers), a larger number of attorneys in a case is
more likely to be associated with greater case complexity and an
increased number of parties, whereas in smaller courts (which tend to
include less populous, and sometimes more rural, areas), a larger number
of attorneys is more likely attributable to geographic dispersal of the
parties and the need for additional, local counsel to file an appearance.46
(noting that large legal teams may be used to prepare complex cases in a timely manner);
Ronald J. Tabak, How Law Firms Can Act to Increase the Pro Bono Representation of
the Poor, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 96 (1990) (recommending that law firms
interested in handling complex pro bono cases “assemble a sufficiently large and
experienced team of attorneys to handle it effectively.”).
44. See, e.g., Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort
Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 910-12 (describing the formation of joint
defense consortia among independent counsel for individual co-defendants).
45. For a comprehensive overview of federal district court practice regarding
temporary admissions and requirements for local counsel, see Richard A. Williamson,
Esq., New York County Lawyers’ Association Report of the Committee on the Federal
Courts on Pro Hac Vice Admissions to the Federal Courts, 169 F.R.D. 390 (1996).
46. We base this presumption in part on the federal courts’ own weighted civil
caseload statistics. Weighted caseload is a measure of the estimated time that a judge
will need to devote to a case over its lifetime and, as such, as a proxy for case
complexity. For Fiscal Year 2006, corresponding to the last year of data in our study,
districts with fifteen or more judges averaged 383 weighted civil filings per judge while
districts with three or fewer judges in that same period averaged 255 weighted filings per
judge. See Table X-1A: Weighted and Unweighted Filings per Authorized Judgeship
During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006, in JAMES C. DUFF, 2006
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR
414-17 (2006) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2006]. This strongly suggests that larger
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With these assumptions and observations in mind, we turn to the
puzzle presented by our model. Why would larger courts have a
comparative efficiency advantage in cases involving fewer attorneys of
record? We have already noted that such cases are more likely to include
at least one pro se litigant, and are also likely to involve fewer parties
and be less complex. One possibility is therefore that larger courts have
more resources—and more flexibility regarding the use of existing
resources—to devote to the expedient resolution of these types of cases.
Although we are aware of no research that has directly addressed this
question, there is some strong circumstantial support for this view. For
example, as a group, larger district courts have been shown to allocate
considerably more time per judge to courtroom hearings than do smaller
district courts.47 Larger district courts also typically have more
magistrate judges, more staff, and sometimes more physical facilities
available to attend to issues raised by self-represented litigants.48 If, as
courts encountered more complex cases on average than smaller courts.
47. See Jordan M. Singer & Hon. William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence:
Federal District Judges in the Courtroom, 2008-2012, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 243, 264
fig.3 (2013) (showing that courts with one to two authorized district judges averaged 408
total courtroom hours per judge per year during Fiscal Years 2008 through 2012, while
courts with twenty-two or more authorized district judges averaged 528 courtroom hours
per judge per year during the same period).
48. A good example of the resource disparity is in the allocation of pro se law
clerks by district. These clerks conduct preliminary merit reviews of many pro se civil
filings and often serve at the forefront of the court’s communication with self-represented
litigants. See Pro Se Law Clerks: A Valuable Resource, THE THIRD BRANCH:
NEWSLETTER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (April 2011), U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/TheThirdBranch/11-0401/Pro_Se_Law_Clerks_A_Valuable_Resource.aspx (last visited March 3, 2014).
Although pro se clerks focus primarily on prisoner petitions, in many district courts they
also review non-prisoner filings from self-represented parties. See id. In September
1995, the Judicial Conference of the United States adopted a formula for pro se law clerk
hiring and allocated one full-time clerk for every 211 prisoner petitions filed in a district.
See Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, September
19, 1995, at 90, U.S. COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf/95-Sep.pdf.
Under this formula, for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2006
(corresponding to the last full reporting year of our study), eleven “large” district courts
with fifteen or more authorized judges would have been allocated an average of 6.0 pro
se clerks each, nineteen “medium” courts with six to eight judges an average of 3.2 pro se
clerks each, and twenty-three “small” courts with one to three judges an average of 0.8
pro se clerks each. See Table C-3: Civil Cases Commenced, by Nature of Suit and
District, During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2006, in JUDICIAL BUSINESS
2006, supra note 46, at 168-73 (identifying the number of prisoner filings per district
court); Chronological History of Authorized Judgeships in the U.S. District Courts, U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/AuthorizedJudgeships/ChronologicalHist
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the IAALS report suggests, case processing time is best controlled by
managing the time between events,49 the greater availability of judges
and court staff to address these issues may well lead to better inter-event
time management. By contrast, smaller courts may lack the equivalent
resource flexibility to address such issues, giving larger courts a
comparative advantage.
What, then, explains the crossover in efficiency at approximately
three total attorneys? Here, we hypothesize that smaller courts have an
entirely different comparative advantage that more than compensates for
resource deficiencies as the number of attorneys increases. That
comparative advantage is cultural. Specifically, smaller courts may
benefit because the local attorneys and judges know each other better.
Earlier research has shown that repeated interactions between
attorneys promotes cooperation in litigation,50 and that increased
interactions between any two people promotes both knowledge-based
trust51 and generally positive views of the other person.52 Specific
research on the criminal justice system has further shown that repeated
interactions between prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, court clerks
and bailiffs creates a “courthouse community”53 featuring an “organized
network of relationships, in which each person who acts on [a] case is
reacting to or anticipating the reactions of others.”54 The civil justice
system features fewer repeat interactions between and among judges and
lawyers than does the local criminal justice system, but even in federal
civil cases, smaller courts (which necessarily have fewer district judges
and which typically have admitted fewer attorneys to practice) benefit
from an increased chance that any two local attorneys will have faced
oryOfAuthorizedJudgeshipsIndex.aspx (identifying the number of authorized judgeships
in each federal district) (last visited March 3, 2014). Although the data used in our study
deliberately excluded prisoner cases, the additional resources brought to bear by pro se
law clerks on non-prisoner litigation suggests a meaningful resource advantage for larger
courts.
49. See CIVIL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 6, at 9-10.
50. See Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit
Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002).
51. See Roy J. Lewicki & Barbara Benedict Bunker, Developing and Maintaining
Trust in Work Relationships, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH 114, 121 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
52. See, e.g., Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Contextualizing Person
Perception: Distributed Social Cognition, 116 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 354 (2009).
53. PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE
GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 39-41 (1988).
54. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 10 (1977).
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each other before, or that any given attorney will have already appeared
before the district judge in a prior case. These previous interactions
build familiarity and confidence in others that can help streamline case
processing. Put another way, by interacting more frequently with the
same judges (and the same pool of local lawyers), local attorneys in
smaller districts are more likely to develop positive views of each other
and build shared expectations about how the case shall be managed. The
comparatively limited number of possible relationship dyads between
and among the bench and bar in smaller districts may well promote and
clarify expectations about the substance and procedure of civil cases
more easily than in larger districts. Because the frequency of repeated
interactions in a small district can be orders of magnitude greater than in
a large district, in cases with many interacting attorneys prior
expectations and relative familiarity with opposing counsel may more
than compensate for a larger court’s resource advantage.
This cultural explanation seems plausible whether the larger number
of attorneys in a case is due to substantive complexity, a high litigant
count, or the geographical dispersal of parties. If the case is complex or
involves many parties but the counsel are primarily (or exclusively)
local, the cultural dynamic described above may promote greater
familiarity and more efficient case processing than in a larger court,
where repeated interactions between and among bench and bar are bound
to be less frequent. If, on the other hand, the larger number of attorneys
is due to the appearance of local counsel to assist lead counsel from
outside the district, local counsel’s knowledge of cultural rhythms and
expectations within the district would still be expected to be transmitted
to co-counsel as well.
These are, again, only initial theories to explain a surprising finding.
Further research would provide a more comprehensive understanding of
the causes and consequences of this result.
VI.

Conclusion

Our analysis of approximately 6700 closed civil cases in seven
federal district courts reveals a surprising relationship between case
length, court size, and the total number of attorneys filing an appearance
in a case. In particular, the predicted case length is longer for smaller
courts than for larger courts when three or fewer total attorneys file an
appearance, but shorter for smaller courts when more than three
attorneys file an appearance. We suggest that these findings might be
explained by larger courts’ comparative efficiency advantage in
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addressing less complex cases (including cases with self-represented
litigants), and smaller courts’ efficiency advantage in fostering
expectations about expedient case processing in cases with a larger
number of attorneys.
There are limitations to our study, and our findings would benefit
from further research. Still, certain tentative observations and a fuller
research agenda present themselves. Scholars, for example, may wish to
examine more closely the relative balance of local and out-of-state
attorneys in different courts and case types and the associated impact of
that balance, analyses not permitted by our data set. Similarly,
researchers may wish to account for the consequences of judicial
vacancies on court resources, an issue that did not affect the courts in our
study (save one) but which has become increasingly pressing in the last
several years.55
Our findings also offer lessons for judges, court administrators and
attorneys. Individual judges and court staff cannot change a court’s size,
resources, or external legal culture on their own even if they are
committed to improving case processing efficiency for all case types. At
the same time, individual districts might consider adopting practices to
compensate for relative inefficiency due to court size and attorney count.
Smaller courts, for example, might explore creative ways to reallocate
resources to allow claims and defenses of self-represented litigants to be
addressed more quickly. Larger courts might explore ways to create a
“small court feel” that will foster more interactions between particular
attorneys and judges, or among attorneys. If further research confirms
the relationships we identify here, court administrators and Congress
might also consider ways to reconfigure district courts to improve
efficiency. Finally, attorneys should consider their respective roles in
lessening—or promoting—delay in civil litigation. While we do not
advocate for radical changes at this juncture, we do hope that our
findings will open the door to new research and policy discussions
designed to advance the larger goal of promoting district court efficiency
and productivity.

55. See Singer & Young, supra note 47, at 257 (describing unfilled vacancies at the
federal district court level for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2011).
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